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11 Introduction
In many countries, zoning is the primary means by which local governments regulate private
land use within their boundaries. Zoning governs private land use in a host of di⁄erent ways:
prohibiting commercial activity in certain areas, limiting the height of buildings, specifying
minimum lot sizes, requiring the presence of private parking and specifying the type of
materials for building exterior. The main rationale for such local government intervention is
to prevent problems due to market failure. For example, restricting the size of commercial
signs may be a sound policy in order to deliver the public good of uncluttered streets.
However, zoning may have undesirable consequences.
One possible negative side e⁄ect of land use regulations relates to their impact on local
competition by increasing costs of local businesses and hence discouraging entry. For in-
stance, some regulations require local businesses to use expensive materials such as brick for
the exterior of their buildings, or to deviate from a prototype building design. Although busi-
ness owners can request re-zoning or special exceptions, these requests need to go through
processes that could involve city administration or politics, often giving rise to considerable
additional expense.
Such anticompetitive e⁄ects of land use regulation have been at the heart of several
law suits and are therefore well-known among legal scholars.1 However, these e⁄ects have
attracted little attention from economists and their quantitative importance is not well-
understood. The goal of this paper is to ￿ll this gap by assessing the actual cost impacts of
land use regulation and its consequence on the intensity of local competition.
Anticompetitive e⁄ects of land use regulation are relevant to various industries in which
￿rms compete locally. Numerous retail industries such as supermarkets, gas stations and
hotels are typical examples. Furthermore, some manufacturing industries that produce time-
sensitive materials such as concrete also belong to this category. Among these industries, this
1Legal scholars have debated as to whether municipalities are immune from antitrust liability arising
from their local ordinances. See Sullivan (2000) for a summary of these arguments and a discussion of
several in￿ uential cases.
2paper focuses on the hotel lodging industry in Texas by taking advantage of the accessibility
to rich microdata.
Several facts draw attention to the anticompetitive e⁄ects of land use regulation in the
lodging industry. First, land use regulation appears to be among the major determinants
of cost structure, and hence it plays a part in the entry decisions of hotels. This industry
is capital-intensive2 and its primary capital input is undoubtedly buildings. Therefore, it is
natural to expect that regulations on buildings should have a signi￿cant cost impact. Second,
competition in this industry is fairly local. Because of the nature of their product, hotels
must locate at the place of consumption; they cannot sell their product without ￿rst having
a physical location inside a market. As a result, competitors are limited to other hotels in
the neighborhood and entry decisions of local rivals are among the primary determinants of
their market power. Third, it appears that people in the lodging industry realize that local
land use regulation can act as an entry barrier for their competitors. This is indicated by
the following quote from a hotel developer:
There￿ s a short answer to why certain hotel developers choose projects encum-
bered with di¢ cult zoning or environmental challenges. It￿ s because once those
hurdles are cleared, they￿ re often left with a hotel with desirable barriers to entry.
Cruz (2003)
One of the major obstacles facing empirical studies of land use regulation is measuring.
Complicated rules and discretion in the actual implementation of these regulations indicate
that no single index provides a de￿nitive measure of the stringency of land use regulation.
Acknowledging this di¢ culty, I employ various measures based on the written survey col-
lected and summarized by Gyourko et al. (2008). Some of these measures are based on
institutional features (e.g., the presence of particular regulations) while some other mea-
sures are based on the results of actual implementation (e.g., the average time length to
2According to an example shown in Powers (1992), the capital cost of a typical 120-room hotel accounts
for about 20 percent of its total expenditure. This ratio is about twice as much as that of a suburban
restaurant.
3obtain a building permit). Realizing that the focus of these indices is residential land use
regulation, I check the robustness of my estimation results by using di⁄erent sets of indices
including one that has more direct relationship with commercial land use regulation.
Reduced-form analyses indicate that markets under stringent land use regulation tend to
have fewer hotels. However, these regressions do not distinguish the cost impact of land use
regulation from its impact on demand. The impact of stringent land use regulation on travel
demand is ambiguous. For example, it may attract more leisure travelers by preserving some
scenic views while it may decrease business travelers by discouraging the construction of
commercial buildings. Therefore, the observed negative correlation in reduced-form analyses
may overestimate or underestimate the actual cost impact of land use regulation. To avoid
this drawback, I pursue a structural estimation approach.
Speci￿cally, I construct a dynamic entry-exit model of hotel chains in which they max-
imize their expected pro￿ts by choosing the number of hotels to open or close in a local
market every period. The revenue of a mid-scale chain hotel is allowed to depend on market
characteristics, chain characteristics and the number of other hotels present in the same
market. Since a new hotel cannibalizes the revenue of other hotels in the same chain, the
marginal revenue of opening an additional hotel monotonically decreases. Hotel chains incur
entry costs and exit costs when they open a new hotel and close an existing hotel, respec-
tively, while they need to pay the operating costs at every period until the hotel closes down.
I assume that each hotel chains￿entry cost and exit cost are stochastic and the actual sizes
of these shocks are observable to this chain only. Therefore, each hotel chain￿ s decision is
based on its belief about its competitors￿decisions. In a Markov Perfect equilibrium, its
belief must be consistent with the actual decisions of its rival chains.
Estimation of this model proceeds in three stages. I ￿rst estimate the parameters of a
hotel-level revenue function. Exploiting the longitudinal structure of the dataset, I identify
market-speci￿c revenue shifters that may be attributable to both observable and unobserv-
able time-invariant factors. Taking the revenue function estimates as given, I next recover
4structural cost parameters by ￿nding a set of parameters that rationalizes both the revenue
function estimates and the observed entry-exit decisions over time. These cost parameters
are chain-market speci￿c. To take into account the interacting decisions of competing hotel
chains while mitigating the computational burden, I employ the estimation method devel-
oped by Bajari et al. (2007). Finally, I regress the recovered cost parameter estimates on
land use regulation indices along with other control variables.
Three key results emerge, consistent with the hypothesis that stringent land use regula-
tion lessens the intensity of competition by increasing the costs. First, an increase in the
stringency of land use regulation by one standard deviation increases operating costs and
entry costs by 8 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Second, these cost increases discourage
entry, decreasing the equilibrium number of hotels by 15 percent. Third, as a consequence
of lessened competition, revenue per room, a good proxy for the price, increases by 5 to 6
percent.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, to the best of my
knowledge, it is the ￿rst to recover the actual cost impacts of land use regulation on local
business markets by controlling its impacts on the demand side. Most economic studies
of land use regulation have focused on its impacts on housing and land markets.3 Few
studies have looked at its cost impacts on business.4 Next, in relation to the literature on
empirical industrial organization, this paper belongs to the literature on ￿rms￿entry decisions
that originated from papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992).5 Among
3For example, see McMillen and McDonald (1991b) for land price, Wu and Cho (2007) and Saiz (2010)
for land development, McConnell et al. (2006) for density and Glaeser et al. (2005), Glaeser and Ward
(2009) and Quigley and Raphael (2005) for housing markets. For a recent survey of empirical studies in this
area, see Evans (1999) and Quigley (2007). Regional Science and Urban Economics published a special issue
featuring studies of land use regulation. For a summary of these papers, see Cheshire and Sheppard (2004).
4One exception is Nishida (2010). In his study on competition between two convenience store chains in
Japan, he includes a dummy variable for zoning as a cost factor by presuming it does not a⁄ect demand
side. He did not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant cost impacts of zoning. Ridley et al. (2010) and OECD (2008)
also study the impacts of land use regulation on businesses from di⁄erent perspective. Ridley et al. (2010)
studies to what extent the fraction of zoned area a⁄ects the intensity of local competition by forcing ￿rms to
locate close to each other. OECD (2008), which coincidentally has a title similar to this paper, documents
several channels through which land use regulation a⁄ects competition and gives several examples taken
from OECD member countries.
5See Berry and Reiss (2007) for a recent survey in this area.
5others, this paper is most closely related to Ryan (2009). In his paper, Ryan estimates
a dynamic entry-exit model of cement plants and evaluates the welfare consequences of a
change in environmental regulation in the Portland cement industry. While Ryan relies
on the intertemporal di⁄erence in industrial structure for identi￿cation, this paper exploits
cross-market di⁄erences in land use regulation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the data used in the
empirical analysis while Section 3 presents the results of the reduced-form regressions. Sec-
tion 4 describes the empirical model used for structural estimation. Section 5 explains the
estimation method, and Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 sets out the
results of counterfactual experiments, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Texas Hotel Data
The main data source of this study, Hotel Occupancy Tax Receipts, is provided by the Texas
Comptroller of Public Accounts.6 This quarterly data set provides the sale of every single
hotel in Texas, as well as other hotel speci￿c information including names, street addresses
and numbers of rooms. In addition, I recover each hotel￿ s brand a¢ liation, if any, by looking
for particular brand names (e.g., Best Western) in the name of each hotel.7 The sample
period of this data set is from the ￿rst quarter of 1990 through the last quarter of 2005. A
notable advantage of this data set is the reliability of its sales data. The original purpose
of this data set was to determine the amount of the hotel occupancy tax to be collected by
hotel owners and passed on to the state government. Because of this nature, misreporting
is unlawful and can be considered tax evasion.
6Other studies using this dataset include Chung and Kalnins (2001), Kalnins (2004) and Conlin and
Kadiyali (2006).
7To increase the accuracy of this process, I rely on other sources, such as AAA Tourbook, Directory of
Hotel & Lodging Companies and various hotel directories provided by the hotel chains themselves.
62.2 Measurement of Land Use Regulation
This study employs the indices developed by Gyourko et al. (2008) to measure the stringency
of land use regulation. Based on a written survey collected from 2,649 local governments
in the U.S., Gyourko and his coauthors construct eleven subindices that measure stringency
of residential land use regulation from various angles as well as one aggregate index (Whar-
ton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, henceforth WRLURI) that is based on these
subindices. This paper uses the aggregate index and the eight subindices that have variation
within Texas.8 Table 1 shows the list of the eight subindices and provides a brief description
of each index. See Gyourko et al. (2008) for the precise de￿nitions of these subindices.
One concern of using these indices in my application is the possible discrepancy between
residential and commercial land use regulation. When these two types of regulation are
di⁄erent in their relative stringency across markets, estimates based on residential land use
regulation indices might bias my empirical results. Ideally I would want to use a set of indices
that directly measures the stringency of commercial land use regulation only. However, to
the best of my knowledge, that data do not exist. As the best feasible option, this paper
instead sticks with the residential land use regulation indices and checks the robustness of
results in the following two ways.
The ￿rst robustness check is to use only the subindices that have direct relationship with
commercial and residential land use regulation. Among the eight subindices shown above,
Project Approval and Zoning Approval meet this criterion. My inquiry into several munici-
pality websites indicates that the administrative process to request rezoning or reviewing a
new project, which is the target of these subindices, does not depend on the type of building
involved in this project.
My second robustness check is to construct new indices based on regulation relevant to
multifamily housing using the raw survey data posted at Gyourko￿ s website. The procedure
8The subindices that do not have variation within Texas include (1) a measure for state level political
pressure, (2) a measure for the in￿ uence of state court and (3) the involvement of the local assembly in the
implementation of land use regulation.
7Table 1: Description of Land Use Regulation Indices
Name Description
Approval Delay The average number of months for which develop-
ers need to wait to obtain building permits before
starting construction.
Density Restrictions Indicate if local governments have minimum lot
size requirements of one acre or more.
Exactions Indicate if developers have to incur the cost of ad-
ditional infrastructure attributable to their devel-
opments.
Open Space Indicates if developers have to provide open space
for the public.
Political Pressure Summarizes subjective impressions of the in￿ u-
ence of various political groups (council, pressure
groups, citizens). Normalized so that its mean and
its standard deviation become zero and one, re-
spectively.
Project Approval The number of local government bodies from
which projects that request NO zoning change
need to obtain approvals.
Supply Restrictions Represent the degree of restrictions that limit the
number of new buildings
Zoning Approval The number of local government bodies from
which projects that request zoning change need to
obtain approvals.
Notes: See Gyourko et al. (2008) for the construction of these indices.
8used to make these new indices are almost the same as the original one except the treatment
of regulation data that is relevant to either single family housing or multifamily housing but
not both.9 Here the underlying assumption is that relative stringency across markets of land
use regulation for multifamily housing (e.g., apartments) is equal to that for commercial
buildings (i.e., hotels). This assumption re￿ ects the fact that municipalities often impose
the same requirements on multifamily housing and commercial building while they impose
di⁄erent requirements on single-family housing. Based on this idea, I construct the three
subindices that correspond to Political Pressure, Approval Delay and Supply Restricitions,
respectively. I am unable to construct similar indices for the rest of the ￿ve subindices
because all the information used to construct these indices is relevant to both single family
housing and multifamily housing. See the Supplementary Appendix for the source of other
data.
2.3 Market De￿nition
This study focuses on local competition between mid-scale chain hotels. To determine mid-
scale brands, I follow a scale constructed by Smith Travel Research, an independent consult-
ing ￿rm specializing in the lodging industry. Among the hotel chains owning these brands,
I consider the six major chains. Table 2 lists the names of these hotel chains and their
mid-scale brands in my sample as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005. These seven chains account
for about 90 percent of the number of mid-scale chain hotels in Texas.
This narrowed focus is bene￿cial since it makes my empirical analysis considerably neat
without losing the essential aspects of local lodging markets. First, as indicated by Mazzeo
(2002), the lodging market is highly segmented by service grades, and competition is stronger
within segments rather than between segments. Second, among the three segments of hotels
(economy, mid-scale and upscale), the mid-scale segment is the largest category in terms
9When a subindex is based on regulation for both single-family and multifamily housing, the original pro-
cedure always uses their average to construct this subindex. In contrast, my procedure uses only information
for multifamily housing. Other than that, my procedure is exactly the same as the original procedure.
9Table 2: Midscale Chain Hotels in Texas
Companies Brands
Best Western Best Western
Cendant Amerihost, Howard Johnson, Ramada
Choice Hotels Clarion, Comfort Inn, Quality Inn, Sleep Inn
Hilton Hotels Hampton Inn
InterContinental Candlewood, Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn Express
La Quinta Baymont Inn, La Quinta Inn
Notes: The number of hotels listed is as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005.
of both the number of hotels and the number of rooms. Third, chain hotels have been the
primary players in this industry. 10 Independent hotels are generally considered to be in the
economy segment, and because services of these other businesses are di⁄erent from those of
the mid-scale hotels, their presence should not be important for the business of mid-scale
hotels.
I consider a county as a single local market since more data is available at the county
level. In addition, county shape is relatively uniform in Texas and borders have been ￿xed
for a long time. Among the 254 counties in Texas, my sample consists of 40 counties that
survive the following three screenings: (1) counties must provide land use regulation indices,
(2) counties must have undergone at least four opens/closures of the mid-scale chain hotels
during the sample period and (3) counties must not be the ￿ agship counties of the four
largest MSAs.1112 Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of these 40 counties.
10In 2005, in Texas, chain hotels account for 37 percent of the total number of hotels, 63 percent of the
total rooms and 75 percent of total sales. The apparently high ratio of non-chain properties is unlikely
to be problematic for my analysis as these non-chain properties consist of independent hotels and various
businesses that are not conventionally considered hotels. Texas statutes (Tax Code, Chapter 156.001) de￿ne
a hotel as ￿a building in which members of the public obtain sleeping accommodations for consideration￿ .
Ranches, cabins and campgrounds all satisfy this de￿nition. Although I remove properties that are obviously
not hotels from my sample, there are a signi￿cant number of properties whose actual categories are unclear.
11These counties are Bexar (San Antonio), Dallas (Dallas-Fort Worth), Harris (Houston), Tarrant (Dallas-
Fort Worth) and Travis (Austin).
12These criteria could generate a selection problem. Secion 7.3 discusses this issue.
10Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Sample Counties (Dark areas)
2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of variables that describe the forty markets in my
sample. The median market has seven mid-scale chain hotels or 573 rooms, and earns about
more than two million dollars for one quarter. Table 3 also shows a considerable variation
between the markets in my sample. In terms of population, the market at the sample third
quartile is more than four times larger than that of the market at the sample ￿rst quartile.
About 80 percent of the markets in this sample have access to an Interstate Highway and
about one-third of them have access to commercial airports. For all the land use regulation
indices, large values imply stringent regulation. The indices that are not binary variables are
normalized so that their sample average and standard deviations are equal to zero and one,
respectively.13 Descriptive statistics of the land use regulation indices indicate that some
of subindices (e.g., Political Pressure or Project Approval) have more variation than others
(e.g., Exactions or Supply Restrictions).
Table 4 shows the sample correlation coe¢ cients between the land use regulation indices
13When counties in my sample contain more than one municipality and land use regulation indices are
available for both municipalities, I use the weighted average of the original indices of these municipalities for
my analysis. City population is used as a weight.
11and (logged) population. First, land use regulation tends to be more stringent in markets
of larger population size. Both the aggregate index (WRLURI) and four subindices show
statistically signi￿cant positive correlation with population. Second, as expected, the aggre-
gate index is positively correlated with some but not all of the subindices.14 Third, four out
of the ￿ve signi￿cant correlations between the subindices are positive, suggesting that lo-
cal governments implement each individual policy according to certain underlying attitudes
such as pro-development or pro-environment. Fourth, the three indices that are based on
regulation for multifamily housing show strong correlations (not reported) with the original
corresponding indices. Each correlation coe¢ cient is larger than 0.96.
3 Reduced Form Analysis
This section examines the empirical relationship between land use regulation and two en-
dogenous variables￿ quantity (the number of mid-scale chain hotels) and price (revenue per
room)￿ by running simple reduced-form regressions.1516 Regressors consist of the land use
regulation indices and various controls that characterize local markets. I use the ordered
logit for the number of hotels and the ordinary least squares (OLS) for the revenue per
room.
The impact of stringent land use regulation on the equilibrium quantity and the equilib-
rium price of local lodging markets is not obvious. According to my hypothesis, stringent land
use regulation decreases supply of lodging services by increasing the cost for hotels. How-
ever, its impact on demand is ambiguous. On one hand, stringent regulation could decrease
local travel demand by discouraging some businesses to come, hence decreasing demand for
business travel. On the other hand, it could increase local travel demand by preserving
a particular local environment (e.g., nice views or clean water) that is attractive to either
14The fact that we observe the forty markets in Texas explains the observed no correlations between the
aggregate index and some subindices.
15The regression using the total number of rooms as its dependent variable generates similar results.
16Increase in revenue-per-room does not necessarily mean increase in prices since not only price, but also
occupancy rates (the number of rooms sold over the total number of rooms), a⁄ect the revenue-per-room.
12Table 3: Summary Statistics of Markets in the Sample
Mean Std.Dev. P25 P50 P75
Midscale Hotels
# of Hotels 9.00 6.06 1.00 7.00 13.50
# of Rooms 790.28 628.00 255.00 573.00 1,206.00
Quarterly Sales (in millions) 3.13 2.88 .79 2.19 4.93
Indices for Land Use Regulation
WRLURI (aggregate index) 0.00 1.00 -0.72 -0.27 0.81
Approval Delay 0.00 1.00 -0.85 -0.14 0.45
Density Restrictions 0.27 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.50
Exactions 0.88 0.29 0.92 1.00 1.00
Open Space 0.45 0.45 0.00 0.31 0.97
Political Pressure 0.00 1.00 -0.85 -0.02 0.60
Project Approval 0.00 1.00 -0.62 -0.05 1.05
Supply Restrictions 0.00 1.00 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29
Zoning Approval 0.00 1.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.64
Other County Characteristics
Population (in thousands) 200.06 190.50 61.96 118.34 278.02
Area (in sq mi) 869.39 255.03 784.22 903.53 945.31
Per Capita Income (in thousands) 27.97 5.49 24.94 27.60 30.89
# of Establishments (in thousands) 3.87 3.38 1.07 2.96 5.81
MSA Dummy 0.75 0.44 0.50 1.00 1.00
Airport Dummy 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Interstate Highway Dummy 0.78 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00
Construction Price Index 0.78 0.03 0.76 0.78 0.80
Notes: N=40. All data are as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005. WRLURI stands for
the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index. Land use regulation index
becomes higher as it becomes more stringent. Hotel data are from Hotel Occu-
pancy Tax Receipts. Land use regulation indices are from Gyoruko et al. (2008).
All other county data are from County Business Patterns, Regional Economics
Information System, PSMeans and road maps. See Section III for details.
13Table 4: Correlation Matrix between Market Size and Land Use Regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) ln Population 1.00 . . . . . . .
(2) WRLURI 0.58￿￿ 1.00 . . . . . .
(3) Approval Delay 0.50￿￿ 0.62￿￿ 1.00 . . . . .
(4) Density Restrictions 0.10 0.48￿￿ 0.14 1.00 . . . .
(5) Exactions -0.10 -0.05 0.19 -0.43￿￿ 1.00 . . .
(6) Open Space 0.46￿￿ 0.66￿￿ 0.34￿￿ -0.01 0.18 1.00 . .
(7) Political Pressure 0.42￿￿ 0.71￿￿ 0.23 0.02 0.08 0.50￿￿ 1.00 .
(8) Project Approval 0.37￿￿ 0.58￿￿ 0.27￿ 0.21 -0.25 0.35￿￿ 0.22 1.00
(9) Supply Restrictions 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.12 -0.18 ￿ 0.06 -0.21 1.00
(10) Zoning Approval 0.07 -0.16 -0.20 -0.14 0.02 0.12 0.10 -0.26 -0.05
Notes: N=40. See Table 1 for the de￿nitions of abbreviations of the land use reg-
ulation indices. Correlation coe¢ cients with ** and * are statistically signi￿cant
at the ￿ve and the ten percent level, respectively.
leisure travelers or certain industries. The standard supply-demand framework predicts that
when stringent land use regulation increases local travel demand overall, the equilibrium
price increases while the change in equilibrium quantity is indeterminate. In contrast, when
stringent land use regulation decreases local travel demand overall, the equilibrium quantity
decreases while the change in equilibrium price is indeterminate.
Table 5 and Table 6 report the estimates of these reduced-form functions based on the
data as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005. First, the regression results show that my control variables
explain about one-third in the variation of the equilibrium quantity and that adding land
use regulation indices to the regressors increases (pseudo) R-squared by 8 percentage points.
In contrast, the same control variables explain twenty seven percent of the variation in
the equilibrium prices while adding land use regulation indices increases R-squared by 21
percentage points.
Second, the parameter estimates indicate that an increase in Project Approval decreases
the equilibrium quantities while increases the equilibrium prices, suggesting the anticom-
petitive e⁄ects of land use regulation. The parameter estimates for Project Approval in
both Table 5 and Table 6 are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. What is more,
these estimates are quite robust regardless of the speci￿cations employed. In contrast, the
14parameter estimate for the aggregate index (WRLURI) is statistically signi￿cant in the re-
gression of the equilibrium quantities but not the equilibrium prices. The estimated impacts
of Project Approval are economically signi￿cant as well. Consider an imaginary market
whose characteristics are equal to the sample median values. My ordered-logit estimates in
the second column of Table 5 indicate that this market is expected to have 4.1 hotels. When
the value of Project Approval increases by one standard deviation, the expected number of
hotels decreases to 3.4 and the equilibrium prices increases by 13 percent.
Third, the parameter estimates of Open Space suggest the importance of controlling the
impacts of land use regulation on the travel demand. The third and the fourth columns of
Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that Open Space has statistically signi￿cant positive impacts on
both the equilibrium quantities and prices. This result would be consistent with the standard
supply-demand framework only when stringent regulation increases the travel demand, and
this demand side e⁄ect dominates the supply-side e⁄ect on the equilibrium quantities.
One concern of these regression results is the possible impacts of land use regulation on
the size of hotels. When the cost impacts of land use regulation depend on the number of
hotels but not the size of hotels, hotel chains might have an incentive to open one large hotel
instead of opening two small hotels. If that were the case, even in the absence of the demand
e⁄ects of land use regulation, negative correlation between the number of hotels and the land
use regulation indices may not necessarily imply lessened competition.
To examine this concern, I regress the size of hotels on the land use regulation indices as
well as other control variables. The sample of this regression is all the midscale-chain hotels
in operation in the ￿rst quarter of 2005. Table 7 reports the results of these regressions.
First, none of the indices that have direct connections with commercial land use regulation
(WRLURI, Project Approval and Zoning Approval) has a statistically signi￿cant impact on
the size of hotels even at the ten percent level. Second, when you include all the subindices,
some subindices (Density Restrictions, Open Space and Political Pressure) present the sig-
ni￿cant impacts on the size of hotels while the direction of these impacts varies. Considering
15Table 5: Ordered Logit Estimates
Dep. Var. # of Hotels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WRLURI -0.931￿￿
(0.436)
Project Approval -1.212￿￿ -1.239￿￿ -1.257￿￿
(0.468) (0.527) (0.521)
Zoning Approval 0.376 0.381 0.345
(0.358) (0.394) (0.399)
Approval Delay -0.246 -0.230
(0.557) (0.540)




Open Space 1.987￿ 1.907￿
(1.119) (1.120)
Political Pressure -0.759 -0.559
(0.467) (0.450)
Supply Restrictions 0.208 0.292
(0.375) (0.378)
Exclude regulation for No N/A No Yes
single-family housing
Log Likelihood -69.722 -65.856 -63.454 -63.934
Pseudo R-squared 0.353 0.389 0.411 0.406
Notes: N=40. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates with ** and * are
statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent and the ten percent level, respectively.
See Table 1 for the de￿nitions of land use regulation indices. Estimates and stan-
dard errors for control variables and thresholds are suppressed. These control
variables include population, the number of establishments, per capita income,
area, construction price index and dummy variables for MSA, access to commer-
cial airports and Interstate Highway. Pseudo R-squared of the ordered logit of
the number of hotels on control variables only are 0.331.
16Table 6: OLS Estimates
Dep. Var. ln (Revenue Per Room)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WRLURI 0.093
(0.066)
Project Approval 0.129￿￿ 0.147￿￿ 0.157￿￿
(0.063) (0.070) (0.067)
Zoning Approval 0.035 0.035 0.020
(0.054) (0.058) (0.057)
Approval Delay -0.004 -0.073
(0.082) (0.075)




Open Space 0.367￿￿ 0.376￿￿
(0.155) (0.153)
Political Pressure -0.055 -0.061
(0.060) (0.059)
Supply Restrictions 0.091 0.089
(0.056) (0.055)
Exclude regulation for No N/A No Yes
single-family housing
R-squared 0.321 0.369 0.513 0.530
Notes: N=40. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates with ** and
* are statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent and the ten percent level, respec-
tively. See Table 1 for the de￿nitions of land use regulation indices. Estimates
and standard errors for control variables and thresholds are suppressed. These
control variables include population, the number of establishments, per capita
income, area, construction price index and dummy variables for MSA, access to
commercial airports and Interstate Highway. R-squared of the OLS of the revenue
per room on control variables only are and revenue-per-room on control variables
only are 0.276.
17seemingly weak connections between these three subindices and commercial land use regu-
lation, the regulation impacts on the size of hotels do not seem a ￿rst-order issue.
The results above suggest some impact of land use regulation on the entry-exit decisions
of the chain hotels and its consequence on the equilibrium prices. Nonetheless, these correla-
tions can be the consequence of demand decrease caused by stringent land use regulation and
the supply side might have nothing to do with it. To identify these two channels separately
from the data, I need to rely on a model and estimate its structural parameters.
4 The Dynamic Entry-Exit Model of Hotel Chains
In this section I construct a dynamic entry-exit model where N hotel chains may operate
multiple hotels in a local market m 2 f1;2;￿￿￿ ;Mg. I omit subscript m from all variables
in this section for simplicity. At the beginning of each period, each chain simultaneously
decides whether it opens a new hotel or closes its existing hotels, if any. Both opening a
new hotel and closing an existing hotel incur some costs while operating existing hotels incur
operating costs. The presence of hotels operated by rival chains a⁄ects chain i￿ s entry and
exit decision through their impacts on the revenue of hotels belonging to chain i.
4.1 State Space
Denote each chain by i 2 f1;::::;Ng and each period by t 2 f1;2;::;1g. Each chain
operates at most H hotels in a market. A common state at period t consists of (i) a vector
of the number of hotels operated by each chain ht = (h1t;h2t;:::;hNt) 2 f0;1;:::;Hg
N and
(ii) a vector of exogenous market-speci￿c characteristics (e.g., population) xt 2 X ￿ RL.
This common state is observable to both hotel chains and econometricians. Denote this
common state variable by st = (ht;xt) 2 S ￿ f0;1;:::;Hg
N ￿ X. At the beginning of
every period, chain i receives two private shocks, one for entry cost ￿1it and one for exit cost
￿2it. These shocks are i.i.d. draws from their joint CDF functions F (￿): While the shape
18Table 7: OLS Estimates of Regulation Impacts on the Size of Hotels Costs
Dep. Var. ln (Number of Rooms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WRLURI -0.037
(0.030)
Project Approval 0.000 -0.018 -0.024
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Zoning Approval 0.006 -0.028 -0.033
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
Approval Delay -0.048 -0.043
(0.036) (0.036)




Open Space -0.273￿￿ -0.267￿￿
(0.077) (0.079)
Political Pressure 0.053￿ 0.057￿￿
(0.027) (0.027)
Supply Restrictions -0.033 -0.038
(0.023) (0.023)
Exclude regulation for No N/A No Yes
single-family housing
R-squared 0.358 0.355 0.391 0.391
Notes: N=325. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates with **
and * are statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent and the ten percent level, re-
spectively. Other regressors whose results are suppressed include chain dummies,
population, the number of establishments, per capita income, area, construction
price index, dummy variables for MSA, access to commercial airports and In-
terstate Highway. Population, the number of establishments, per capita income
and area are in log. R-squared of the regressions of the number of rooms on the
control variables only is 0.358.
19of the distribution function F (￿) is common and known to all players, realized cost shocks
￿it = (￿1it;￿2it) are private and only observable to chain i.
4.2 Choice Space
At the beginning of every period, each chain simultaneously chooses the number of hotels it
opens or closes. Let ait denote the change in the number of hotels chain i operates between
period t and t + 1. Positive ait indicates opening a new hotel while negative ait indicates
closing one of its existing hotels. I assume that choices made at period t are realized at t+1,
hence hit+1 = hit + ait holds. I also assume that hotel chains do not open or close more
than one hotel in the same period.17 Since the resulting number of hotels after this change
still has to be an element of f0;1;:::;Hg, chain i￿ s choice set is a function of the number of
hotels it currently operates, hit, and is written as
Ait (hit) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f 0; 1 g;
f ￿1; 0; 1 g;
f ￿1; 0 g;
if hit = 0;
if 0 < hit < H;
if hit = H:
(1)
4.3 Period Pro￿t
Chain i￿ s expected period pro￿t comes from any remaining of its expected revenue after
subtracting the operating costs of its existing hotels, the entry cost of opening a hotel and
the exit cost of a hotel it closes. Given the current state (st;￿it) and its choice ait 2 Ait (hit),
chain i￿ s choice-speci￿c expected period pro￿t is written as:
￿i (ait;st;￿it) = ERi (st) ￿ ￿ihit ￿ 1(ait = 1)(ei ￿ ￿1￿1it) ￿ 1(ait = ￿1)(￿￿2￿2it); (2)
17This assumption is not restrictive in practice since hotel chains rarely open or close more than one hotel
in the same quarter. Out of 15,120 data points in my sample, only 17 data points (0.11 percent) experience
this event. In estimation, I treat these data points as if the change were (minus) one rather than (minus)
two.
20where ERi (st) represents the expected revenue of chain i from its current operation of hit
hotels, ￿i denotes the cost of operating a hotel for one period18, (ei ￿ ￿1￿1it) is the entry cost
and (￿￿2￿2it) is the exit cost. Here the mean exit cost is assumed to be zero, and ￿1 and ￿2
represent scale parameters for entry and exit costs, respectively.19 Exploiting its linearity, I
rewrite (2) as the product of two vectors
￿i (ait;st;￿it) = ￿(ait;st;￿it)
0 ￿i; (3)
where ￿(ait;st;￿it) = [ERi (st);￿hit;￿1(ait > 0);1(ait > 0)v1it;1(ait < 0)v2it] and ￿i =
[1;￿i;ei;￿1;￿2].
4.4 Transition of State Variables
I assume that exogenous market-speci￿c characteristics xt follow a Markov process. Let
P (s0js;a) : S￿S￿A ! [0;1] denote the evolution of the common state variables s conditional
on hotel chains￿choices a where a 2A = f￿1;0;1g
N.
4.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
I assume that chain i￿ s decision is characterized by a pure Markov strategy ￿i (s;￿i) : S￿R !
A. Let ￿ (s;￿) = f￿1 (s;￿);:::;￿N (s;￿)g be a vector of each chain￿ s Markov strategy while
￿￿i (s;￿) = ￿ (s;￿)nf￿i (s;￿)g be a vector of all but chain i￿ s Markov strategies. Let
￿ 2 (0;1) denote a discount factor common to all chains. Chain i￿ s discounted sum of
expected pro￿ts at time t under ￿ is










= Wi (s;￿)￿i; (4)
18I assume that operation costs are constant returns to the number of hotels to maintain the linearity of
the period pro￿t function while maintaining the number of parameters to be small.
19I put minus signs before ￿s for notational convenience.
21where the expectations of the above formula is de￿ned by the distributions of ￿i￿ and s￿,







In a Markov perfect equilibrium, every chain￿ s equilibrium strategy must be the best
response to its rivals￿equilibriumstrategies. Formally speaking, a Markov perfect equilibrium

















for all i, s 2 S and ￿
0
i: (5)























I estimate the structural parameters of the model presented in the previous section by apply-
ing the estimation method proposed by Bajari et al. (2007) to the data of M local markets.
Estimation consists of three stages. In the ￿rst stage, I separately estimate hotel-level rev-
enue functions, hotel chains￿policy functions and transition functions. In the second stage, I
￿nd the set of structural cost parameters that make the observed policy the most pro￿table
choice compared to possible alternatives given the environment speci￿ed by the transition
functions and the hotel-level revenue function. In the third stage, I infer the relationship be-
tween the recovered market-speci￿c cost parameters and the stringency of land use regulation
by running regressions.
225.1 First Stage
Consider a local market m 2 f1;2;￿￿￿ ;Mg. Let rikmt denote the revenue of chain i￿ s kth
hotel at period t in market m. This revenue is given by
lnrikmt (smt) = ￿i + ￿1m + x
0
1mt￿2 ￿ ￿3 ln(￿jhjmt) ￿ ￿4 lnhimt + ￿ikmt; (7)
where ￿i is a chain dummy, ￿1m is a market ￿xed e⁄ect and ￿ikmt is an error term. Ex-
ogenous market-speci￿c characteristics x1mt consist of (i) population, (ii) the number of
establishments and (iii) state-level sales of mid-scale hotels. The last one is put to capture
the state-wide time trend.20 I also include the quarter-speci￿c dummies, which I omit from
(7) for the sake of the simplicity. The fourth and ￿fth regressors, ￿jhjt and hit, represent
the revenue impacts of the presence of other hotels in the same market. While the fourth
term represents the intensity of local competition, the ￿fth term captures the possible higher
substitution between hotels belonging to the same chain (cannibal e⁄ects).
I estimate this function by OLS. The consistency of these OLS estimates rely on the
assumption that ￿ikmt satis￿es strong exogeneity. In particular, I assume that ￿ikmt is an
i.i.d. draw from a normal distribution.21 To justify these assumptions, I control the following
three factors that can be a source of serial correlation: (i) time-invariant market-speci￿c
characteristics, (ii) time-invariant chain-speci￿c characteristics and (iii) quarterly shocks.
The dummy variables inserted in (7) deal with the ￿rst three factors. Time trend does not
appear here since state-wide sales in x1mt capture the time trend.
I represent hotel chains￿policy functions by a variant of the multinomial logit model. I
impose three assumptions. First, the private cost shocks, ￿1imt and ￿2imt, have the same
scale parameter, namely ￿ = ￿1 = ￿2. Second, these private cost shocks are an i.i.d. draw
from the Type I extreme value distribution whose mean is zero and whose variance is ￿2
6 .
20I do not employ time dummy variables here. The model with them does not allow me to simulate hotel
chains￿revenue out of the sample period while such simulations are necessary in the second stage.
21Imposing the normality here allows me to calculate E (rikmt (smt)) in an analytical form. Consistency
does not require this assumption though.
23Third, the maximum number of hotels a chain can operate in a market is seven H = 7.22 Let
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5 if aimt 2 Ai (smt)
￿1 otherwise
. (8)
Under this notation, chain i￿ s decision problem is written as
max(￿i (1;smt) + v1imt; ￿i (0;smt); ￿i (￿1;smt) + v2imt). (9)
Although v1imt and v2imt are assumed to be the Type I extreme value distribution, the choice
probability of the conventional multinomial logit model is not applicable here since hotel
chains￿payo⁄s are not subject to any cost shock when they neither open nor close a hotel
(i.e., aimt = 0). Therefore I derive the choice probabilities that directly capture this particular
feature.2324 To estimate these policy functions, I need to specify both ￿(1;smt)￿￿(￿1;smt)
and ￿(0;smt) ￿ ￿(￿1;smt) as a function of observable characteristics. I approximate them
as a linear function of state variables smt, chain-￿xed e⁄ects and market ￿xed e⁄ects.25
The land use regulation indices do not appear here as they have perfect collinearity with
market ￿xed e⁄ects. I use maximum likelihood for this estimation. I estimate the transition
functions of xt by running AR1 regressions.
22This upper limit is hardly restrictive. During the sample period, only one hotel chain hits this limit.
23See Supplementary Appendix for the derivations of these choice probabilities.
24Taking into account this nature of the model is important to make forward simulations explained later
consistent with the model.
25Ideally, one might want to employ a more ￿ exible form by inserting, for example, a dummy variable for
each chain-market pair or estimating a policy function for each market. However, data limitation does not
allow me to take this approach. For example, suppose a hotel chain has not operated any single hotel during
the sample period in a market (i.e.,himt = 0 for all t). If I employ one of the ￿ exible forms mentioned above,
the predicted probability of entry becomes zero even when the actual entry probability is strictly positive.
Under the current speci￿cation, the predicted probability of each choice is always strictly positive as long as
there is at least one entry and exit for every chain and for every market during the sample period.
245.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, I estimate the set of chain i￿ s structural cost parameters in market, m





de￿ned in the previous section by forward simulations. I consider
the following two situations: (1) when all chains follow the observed policy; and (2) when all
hotel chains except chain i follow the observed policies while chain i follows a policy that is






For notational convenience, let ￿0







for every k 2 f0;1;￿￿￿ ;NIg. For kth estimation, I simulate each chain￿ s
decisions over T periods for NS times by using the policy functions and transition functions



























￿=0.26 I use the revenue function estimated in the ￿rst stage to calculate
g ER
k;n

























































See Supplementary Appendix for the algorithm of these forward simulations, including the
way to choose inequalities. In the actual estimations, I employ the following setting: NI =
800, NS = 10;000, T = 80 and ￿ = 0:974.27
I next estimate structural cost parameters by using the simulation results obtained by
eq (10). Let gimk (￿im) denote a function that calculates to what extent the observed policy
￿0
im brings more pro￿t to chain i compared to the kth alternative policy ￿k
im when its rivals
26These two shocks do not have a superscript k since I use the same set of draws for every policy
k 2 f0;￿￿￿ ;NIg.
27Note that the unit of the time period is quarter rather than year. Hence T = 80 is equivalent to 20
years and ￿ = 0:974 is equivalent to 0:9 annual discount rate.





















I evaluate a set of parameters ￿im by employing the following loss function
(minfgimk (￿im);0g)
2 . (12)
This loss function gives zero when the observed policy ￿0
im brings more pro￿t than the kth
alternative policy ￿k
im. When the opposite is true, this function gives the squared expected
di⁄erence in the resulting pro￿ts between these two policies. Finally I estimate a set of
structural cost parameters ￿￿ = f￿
￿
imgi;m by ￿nding the one that minimizes the sum of















The last step infers the impacts of the stringency of land use regulation on structural cost
parameters (￿im;eim) by running regressions. I assume that the logarithms of these costs are
linear functions of the land use regulation indices, hotel chain dummy and other observable
market characteristics.
28What distinguishes (￿im;eim) from (￿i0m0;ei0m0) in this estimation is the variation in the parameter
estimates of market dummies and chain dummies in both the revenue function and the policy function. These
dummies are either chain-speci￿c or market-speci￿c but not chain-market speci￿c. Therefore estimation in
the second stage is the mapping from both chain-speci￿c variables and market-speci￿c variables to chain-
market speci￿c variables. Due to nonlinearity of this mapping, resulting structural parameters do not have
additivity such as ￿im = ￿i + ￿m for all i and m.
26Table 8: Estimates of Policy Functions
Policy Functions
(1) (2)
￿(1) ￿(0) ￿(1) ￿(0)
￿￿(￿1) ￿￿(￿1) ￿￿(￿1) ￿￿(￿1)
# of Hotels 0.007 0.022 -0.061 -0.178
(0.036) (0.041) (0.052) (0.062)
# of Hotels under -0.714 -0.998 -0.787 -1.060
the Same Chain (0.089) (0.110) (0.105) (0.123)
Log Likelihood -2324.542 -2280.459
Market Dummy No Yes
Notes: N=15,120. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates and standard
errors of control variables (population, the number of establishments, market
dummies and chain dummies are suppressed. Likelihood functions take into ac-




Table 8 shows the estimation results of the policy function. To see the empirical importance
of unobservable market-speci￿c characteristics, I estimate this function under two di⁄erent
speci￿cations: one with market dummy variables and one without them. The estimation
results indicate that including market dummy variables into regressors are crucial to properly
characterize the policy functions. As shown in Table 8, these two speci￿cations provide quite
di⁄erent conclusions on the extent to which the presence of incumbents a⁄ect hotel chains￿
entry decisions. These results suggest that observable characteristics (i.e., population and
establishments) are not su¢ cient to characterize the demand size of local markets. Hereafter
I use the estimation results of the model using market dummy variables.
To provide some idea about what these estimates imply, I calculate the change in Best
Western￿ s predicted entry (i.e., aimt = 1) and exit (i.e., aimt = ￿1) probabilities in a market29
as the number of hotels in this market increases. I consider the following two cases. In case
29This ￿gure uses the data of Potter county, a part of the Amarillo MSA, in the ￿rst quarter of 2005.
The population of this market is close to the sample median in this period.






TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE1: RIVAL CHAINS OPEN HOTELS
Probability of Opening
Probability of Closing






TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE2: BEST WESTERN OPENS HOTELS
Probability of Opening
Probability of Closing
Figure 2: Impacts of the number of incumbents on Best Western￿ s entry decisions
one, the number of hotels belonging to the other hotel chains increases from ten to ￿fteen
while Best Western operates only one hotel. In case two, the number of hotels operated by
Best Western increases from zero to ￿ve while the number of hotels operated by the other
chains is ￿xed at eleven. In both cases, the total number of hotels increases from eleven to
sixteen. Figure 2 shows the result of this exercise. In case one, Best Western￿ s entry proba-
bility decreases from about 10 percent to 6 percent as its rival chains open new hotels while
its exit probability slightly increases from 0.7 percent to 1 percent. In contrast, re￿ ecting
high substitution between hotels under the same chain, its entry probability decreases from
13 percent to 1.7 percent and its exit probability increases from 0 percent to 20 percent.
Table 9 shows the estimation results of the hotel-level revenue function speci￿ed in eq
(7). I use the OLS for this estimation. To take into account possible correlations between
error terms of hotels that operate in the same market at the same time, I employ the
standard errors robust to clustering. I estimate this function under two speci￿cations, with
28and without using market dummy variables.
First, the estimation results show that imposing market-speci￿c dummy variables signif-
icantly changes some of the estimates. In particular, the parameter estimate for the number
of rival hotels (the ￿rst row) changes from -0.047 to -0.380. These results imply that ig-
noring market-speci￿c unobservable factors lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. For
further analysis, I use the parameter estimates in Column (2). Second, the presence of other
hotels signi￿cantly reduces the revenue of a hotel. In particular, its revenue impact becomes
more severe when the hotel and its rival hotels belong to the same chain, re￿ ecting possible
cannibalization. Figure 3 visibly illustrates the implication of these results by showing how
the revenue of a hotel, rather than a chain, decreases as other hotels open. To highlight the
distinct revenue impacts from hotels belonging to the same chain and those belonging to
its rival chains, the ￿gure considers two situations: (1) when all of its rival hotels belong to
other hotel chains and (2) when the hotel and all of its rival hotels belong to the same chain.
My estimation results imply that a hotel￿ s revenue under duopoly is about 23 percent lower
than the one under monopoly when its rival belongs to a di⁄erent chain. However, when its
rival hotel belongs to the same chain, its revenue decreases by 34 percent.30
To check the quantitative importance of controlling the stringency of land use regulation
on the demand side, I regress the estimated market ￿xed e⁄ects of the revenue function on
the land use regulation indices as well as the other control variables used in the reduced form
analysis. Omitted regression results suggest the importance of controlling the impacts of land
use regulation on the demand side to isolate the cost impacts of land use regulation. First,
although none of the estimates on land use regulation indices are individually signi￿cant when
all the indices are included, these estimates are jointly signi￿cant at the the 1 percent level
according to the F test. Second, land use regulation indices are quantitatively important.
30One might wonder why more intense competition due to the change from monopoly to duopoly does
not decrease the revenue of a hotel more than ￿fty percent. This conjecture is not necessarily true in my
setting, which abstracts hotel chains￿within-market location decisions. The location of the second hotel is
generally di⁄erent from that of the ￿rst one and as a result the ￿rst hotel needs to compete with the second
hotel for only a fraction of its potential customers.
29Table 9: Revenue Function Estimates
(1) (2)
# of Hotels -0.047 -0.380
(0.023) (0.025)
# of Hotels under the Same Chain -0.198 -0.230
(0.019) (0.018)
Market Dummy No Yes
R-squared 0.998 0.998
Notes: N=13,626. Cluster standard errors are in parentheses. Each cluster is
market and time period speci￿c. Other control variables include population, the
number of establishments and sales. All of these variables are in log. Estimates
and standard errors for these control variables, market dummies, chain dummies
and quarter dummies are suppressed.









TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE 1: ALL RIVAL HOTELS BELONG TO RIVAL CHAINS
CASE 2: ALL RIVAL HOTELS BELONG TO THE SAME CHAIN
Figure 3: Revenue Impacts of Having Rival Hotels
For example, the change in the values of these indices from the ￿rst sample quartile to the
third sample quartile decreases the revenue by 2 percent.
The estimation results of the transition functions for state-level sales, market-level estab-
lishments and population are in Supplementary Appendix.
6.2 Second Stage
The second stage estimation provides the scale parameter ￿ and a pair of operating cost and
entry cost (￿mi;emi) for each combination of market-chain. Table 10 reports the descriptive
30Table 10: Summary Statistics of the Cost Parameter Estimates
Operating Entry
Cost (￿) Cost (e)
All Samples
Mean 232.5 3,714.0
Std. Dev. 153.6 1,030.2
Mean by Chains
Best Western 163.8 3,709.3
Cendant 114.3 3,973.7
Choice Hotels 114.0 3,839.9
Hilton 223.3 4,274.4
Inter-Continental 385.5 3,505.4
La Quinta 416.1 2,909.7
Notes: N=40. All statistics are in thousands of dollars. Operating cost expresses
the amount of cost a hotel incurs for its three-month operation.
statistics of these cost parameter estimates.
Under the assumption that the mean exit cost is zero, the average hotel chain incurs
$233 thousand each quarter to operate a hotel and about $3.7 million to open a new hotel in
the average market. Their standard deviations indicate that these cost parameter estimates
signi￿cantly vary across the markets. Furthermore, the last six rows of this table indicate
signi￿cant cost di⁄erence across chains. The di⁄erence can be explained by di⁄erence in
capacity and di⁄erence in quality such as the availability of free breakfast or business centers.
6.3 Third Stage: Cost Function Regression
Table 11 and 12 report the regression estimates for the operating costs (￿mi) and the entry
costs (emi).31 To avoid omitted variable problems, all the regressions here include the control
variables used in the reduced form regressions.
The ￿rst two columns of Table 11 show that an increase in either WRLURI or Project
Approval by one standard deviation increases the operating costs by 8 percent.32 However,
31I exclude the six chain-market pairs whose entry cost estimates are zeros from these regressions.
32There are several situations that land use regulation may a⁄ect the operating costs of hotels. First,
obeying regulation may require frequent maintenance of buildings. Second, in markets with tight regulation
on signs, hotels need to advertise their presence by more expensive ways such as advertisements in travel
guides.
31as shown in the last two columns of the same table, the statistical signi￿cance of Project
Approval goes away once I include the other subindices. Excluding the data of regulation
aimed for single-family housing makes little di⁄erence.
The parameter estimates in the last two regressions are di¢ cult to interpret. First, while
all the parameter estimates except the one for Project Approval are statistically signi￿cant,
￿ve out of the seven estimates have negative signs, indicating stringent regulation decreases
the operating costs. Second, evaluating the total impacts of these estimates is tricky. Suppose
I calculate the total impacts by increasing all of the indices by one standard deviation. This
change is hardly comparable to an increase by one standard deviation in either the aggregate
index or Project Approval because the correlations between these indices are weak (See Table
4).
To provide some idea of these estimates despite this di¢ culty, I compare the impacts
of these subindices between two markets whose aggregate indices is about one standard
deviation away.33 The results are somewhat mixed. Among three pairs of such markets,34 the
only one pair ￿nds that the order of their aggregate indices matches with that of the predicted
impacts. These results along with the negative signs of the estimates may suggest weak
correlations between the stringency of commercial land use regulation and the subindices
that have no direct relationship with commercial buildings.
As for the entry costs, Table 12 shows that an increase in Project Approval by one stan-
dard deviation increases the entry cost by 10 percent. Remarkably, this result is quite robust
to all the three speci￿cations that involve this index. These estimates are statistically signif-
icant at the ￿ve percent level for the ￿rst two speci￿cations while its signi￿cance level goes
down to the ten percent level for the last speci￿cation. Unlike the regressions of operating
33To be precise, I ￿rst calculate the products of each subindex and its corresponding estimate and sum
them up. I next calculate the value of the exponential function using this total value as its argument. I
compare the markets within in the same pair by using this value. I do not use the predicted value of the
operating costs as it re￿ ects other characteristics of each market.
34I consider the following three pairs: (1) San Patricio and Lubbok, (2) Wise and Nagogdoches and (3)
Orange and Wise. For every pair, the market that comes ￿rst has more stringent regulation in terms of the
aggregate index.
32costs, neither the parameter estimates of the aggregate index (WRLURI) nor those of the
other subindices are statistically signi￿cant.
There are two possible limitations in these estimates. First, market-speci￿c costs and
the stringency of land use regulation may be determined simultaneously. Consider a local
market whose cost of doing business is high for some reason other than land use regulation. To
stimulate its economy, the local government of this market might not impose tight regulations
to attract businesses. If this is the case, these regression estimates are possibly inconsistent.
The standard solution of this problem is to ￿nd valid instruments that exogenously shift
the stringency of land use regulation. However, there is little hope of ￿nding such valid
instruments,35 let alone the fact that I would have to ￿nd seven di⁄erent such instruments.
Second, the criteria that are used to select sample markets may cause a sample selection
problem. In particular, my sample excludes the markets that underwent very few entries
and exits during the sample period. Excluding these markets does not seem to a⁄ect policy
function estimates since their slight variations result in a very large (or very small) market
￿xed e⁄ects and do not have an e⁄ect on other estimates. However, regressions in the third
stage can be problematic. For example, suppose that markets with high entry costs tend to
undergo fewer entries and hence are less likely to be in my sample. If this is the case, my
regressions in the third stage are subject to a selection bias.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
This section reports the results of counterfactual experiments, using the parameter estimates
obtained in the previous section. The goal of this exercise is to quantitatively evaluate the
cost impacts of land use regulation on the decisions of hotel chains and hence the intensity of
competition. To isolate this particular e⁄ect, I construct an imaginary environment where a
35McMillen and McDonald (1991a) examines the possible selection bias in land value function estimation
when zoning decisions are endogenous. For instruments, they use an indicator variable that tells whether a
parcel is incorporated or not by municipals. This instrument is not applicable in my study since my study
focuses on the e⁄ects of land use regulation on a county as a whole rather than each single parcel within a
county.
33Table 11: OLS Estimates of Regulation Impacts on the Operating Costs
Dep. Var. ln (Operating Costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WRLURI 0.085￿￿
(0.028)
Project Approval 0.081￿￿ 0.028 0.032
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Zoning Approval 0.011 -0.058￿ -0.072￿￿
(0.026) (0.031) (0.031)
Approval Delay -0.094￿￿ -0.133￿￿
(0.035) (0.035)




Open Space 0.122￿ 0.104￿
(0.065) (0.060)
Political Pressure 0.077￿￿ 0.087￿￿
(0.025) (0.026)
Supply Restrictions -0.092￿￿ -0.107￿￿
(0.040) (0.040)
Exclude regulation for No N/A No Yes
single-family housing
R-squared 0.769 0.770 0.819 0.828
Notes: N=234. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates with **
and * are statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent and the ten percent level, re-
spectively. Other regressors whose results are suppressed include chain dummies,
population, the number of establishments, per capita income, area, construction
price index, dummy variables for MSA, access to commercial airports and In-
terstate Highway. Population, the number of establishments, per capita income
and area are in log. R-squared of the regressions of operating cost on the control
variables only is 0.763.
34Table 12: OLS Estimates of Regulation Impacts on the Entry Costs
Dep. Var. ln (Entry Costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WRLURI 0.059
(0.044)
Project Approval 0.103￿￿ 0.108￿￿ 0.100￿
(0.047) (0.544) (0.055)
Zoning Approval 0.042 0.032 0.035
(0.033) (0.038) (0.035)
Approval Delay -0.050 -0.026
(0.034) (0.033)




Open Space 0.058 0.052
(0.093) (0.093)
Political Pressure -0.010 -0.009
(0.031) (0.031)
Supply Restrictions -0.004 -0.006
(0.046) (0.045)
Exclude regulation for No N/A No Yes
single-family housing
R-squared 0.194 0.213 0.219 0.217
Notes: N=234. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates with **
and * are statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent and the ten percent level, re-
spectively. Other regressors whose results are suppressed include chain dummies,
population, the number of establishments, per capita income, area, construction
price index, dummy variables for MSA, access to commercial airports and Inter-
state Highway. Population, the number of establishments, per capita income and
area are in log. R-squared of the regressions of entry cost on the control variables
only is 0.187.
35change in land use regulation a⁄ects only costs but not demand. Ideally, one wants to simu-
late the entry-exit decisions of the six hotel chains. However, solving even a Markov perfect
equilibrium of six heterogeneous players is numerically demanding. For that reason, I instead
simulate the model in an environment in which solving an equilibrium is computationally
feasible.
Counterfactual experiments consider Grayson County, in which two hotel chains (Best
Western and Cendant) choose their entry decisions every period. In 2005, the population of
this market is equal to the sample median. I simulate the entry-exit decisions of these two
hotel chains under three di⁄erent policies: Lenient, Observed and Stringent. Each policy
is di⁄erent in the value of Project Approval. While Observed uses the actual value of this
market, the value of this index is smaller for Lenient and larger for Stringent by one standard
deviation compared to the observed value. To calculate the operating costs and the entry
costs under each policy, I use the parameter estimates in the second column of Table 11 and
Table 12. See Supplementary Appendix for the actual procedure of these experiments.
Table 13 reports the results of the counterfactual experiments. All variables except
producer surplus are based on the sample average of the simulated periods while the producer
surplus comes from the value of the value function under the initial state.36 These results
indicate that cost increase due to stringent land use regulation has a sizable e⁄ect on chains￿
entry decisions. Under the most lenient policy (Lenient), the average number of hotels in this
market is 2.3. As the policy becomes more stringent, this number decreases to 2.0 (Observed)
and 1.7 (Stringent). Assuming the number of rooms in each hotel is equal to the chain-
average, these results imply that imposing stringent regulation increases the revenue per room
by 3 percent (Lenient!Observed) and 12 percent (Observed!Stringent). These increases
are suggestive of higher prices in the market imposing more stringent regulation. Despite of
their higher market power, the hotel chains do not necessarily make higher pro￿ts. According
to the results, the total producer surplus decreases by $3.2 million (Lenient!Observed) and
36I am unable to calculate the consumer surplus since the model abstracts the demand side by using the
revenue function.
36Table 13: Counterfactual Experiments
Land Use Regulation
Lenient Observed Stringent
Operating Costs (in thousand dollars)
Best Western 89.43 99.14 109.89
Cendant 73.74 81.74 90.61
Entry Costs (in million dollars)
Best Western 4.47 4.84 5.25
Cendant 3.76 4.08 4.42
# of Hotels
Total 2.3 2.0 1.7
Best Western 1.1 0.9 0.8
Cendant 1.2 1.1 0.9
Daily Revenue per Room (in dollars)
Best Western 28.1 29.9 31.5
Cendant 14.6 15.4 16.4
Producer Surplus (in million dollars)
Total 14.95 11.79 9.01
Best Western 6.32 4.88 3.64
Cendant 8.63 6.91 5.37




This paper studies the role of land use regulation as a barrier to entry in the case of the Texas
lodging industry. The estimation results indicate that stringent land use regulation lessens
local competition by increasing the costs of hotels. According to my estimates, its change b
y one standard deviation increases the operating cost by 8 percent and the entry costs by
10 percent, respectively. This cost increase discourages hotel chains￿entry, decreasing the
equilibrium number of hotels by 15 percent. As a result, the revenue-per-room, a proxy for
the price, increases by 5 to 6 percent.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst that empirically examines the anti-
competitive e⁄ect of land use regulation on local business markets by taking into account
37its impacts on the demand. Although people in the lodging business and legal scholars have
noticed it, there has been no formal analysis that quanti￿es this e⁄ect. This paper also con-
tributes an introduction of structural estimation to the literature on the empirical studies of
land use regulation. The structural estimation employed in this paper has the advantage of
separately identifying the impacts of land use regulation on costs from those on demand.
Note that this paper is not intended to be the ￿nal word on land use regulation. It
focuses on the anticompetitive e⁄ect of land use regulation and ignores its other possible
bene￿ts and costs. Therefore, the results of this paper are not su¢ cient per se to make
￿nal judgments about its e¢ cacy. When it generates bene￿ts to society through some other
channels (e.g., resolves externalities), land use regulation could be bene￿cial overall, despite
the potential distortion that is the focus of this paper.
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40A Appendix: Other Data
Demographic data is from the decennial census and the Regional Economics Information
System provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This demographic data includes pop-
ulation, per capita personal income and area. Local business activity data is obtained from
County Business Patterns provided by the Census Bureau. This business data includes the
number of employees and the number of establishments. I also construct dummy variables
for each county￿ s access to the Interstate Highway System along with their access to com-
mercial airports from road maps and the Internet. Construction cost data comes from Means
Square Foot Costs provided by RSMeans.
B Appendix: Derivation of the Choice Probability
This appendix derives the choice probabilities when a hotel chain￿ s decision problem is writ-
ten as
max(￿(1;s) + ￿1; ￿(0;s); ￿(￿1;s) + ￿2).
I omit all subscripts for simplicity. While this model is quite similar to the standard multino-
mial logit model, the lack of stochastic shock in a particular choice (i.e., a = 0) brings di⁄er-
ent forms of the choice probabilities. The derivation is quite similar to that of the standard
multinomial logit model shown in, for example, Train (2003). For notational purpose, I ￿rst
rewrite this problem as
max(g1 + ￿1; g0; ￿i2)
41where
g1 = ￿(1;s) ￿ ￿(￿1;s)
g0 = ￿(0;s) ￿ ￿(￿1;s):
The probability that hotel chains choose no change is
Pr(a = 0) = Pr(g0 > ￿2 and g0 > g1 + ￿1)
















The probability that hotel chains choose closing a hotel is




























Denoting t = e￿￿2, I have d￿2 = ￿ dt
e￿￿2 = ￿dt
t .


































42Finally, the probability that hotel chains choose opening a new hotel (i.e., a = 1) is
Pr(a = 1) = 1 ￿ Pr(a = ￿1) ￿ Pr(a = 0)
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ Pr(a = 0))
1
eg1 + 1
￿ Pr(a = 0)




Summarizing the result, if h 2 f1;￿￿￿ ;6g,
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
Pr(a = ￿1) = (1 ￿ exp(￿e￿g0 (1 + eg1))) ￿ 1
eg1+1
Pr(a = 0) = exp(￿e￿g0 (1 + eg1))




> > > > <
> > > > :
Pr(a = ￿1) = (1 ￿ U (s)) ￿ 1
1+exp(￿(1;s)￿￿(￿1;s))















If ￿(￿1;s) ! ￿1 (i.e., h = 0);
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
Pr(a = ￿1) = 0
Pr(a = 0) = exp
￿
￿e￿(1;s)￿￿(0;s)￿




43If ￿(1;s) ! ￿1 (i.e., h = 7);
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
Pr(a = ￿1) = 1 ￿ exp
￿
￿e￿(￿(0;s)￿￿(￿1;s))￿
Pr(a = 0) = exp
￿
￿e￿(￿(0;s)￿￿(￿1;s))￿
Pr(a = 1) = 0:
44C Appendix: Implementing Forward Simulations
The steps below explain how to implement the simulation to calculate eq (10):
1. Fix a market m and a hotel chain i.
2. Simulate a series of exogenous time-variant market speci￿c variables over T periods for




its nth series. For the initial value e xn
m1, use the corresponding value in the raw data
at the initial sample period in market m.
3. Simulate chain i￿ s cost shocks (~ ￿n
1im￿; ~ ￿n
2im￿) over T periods for NS times by generating
random draws from Type I extreme value distribution whose mean is normalized to be
zero and whose variance is equal to ￿2
6 .
4. Generate chain i￿ s NI alternative policies by perturbing the observed policy function




of i.i.d. random draws from the standard normal. The length
of ￿k is equal to the number of the parameters of the policy functions. Second, I
































￿=0 for NS times when ￿k
im decides its choice while
















the initial value e h
k;n
m1, uses the corresponding value in the raw data at the initial
sample period in market m.
45Table 14: Transition Function Estimates
Dependent Variables
Sales Population Establishments




R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999
Notes: N=63 for sales and 1,020 for establishments and population. Standard
errors are in parentheses. All dependent variables are in log. Estimates and
standard errors for quarter dummies suppressed.
(b) Simulate the choice of all hotel chains at period one e a
k;n




2im1g for chain i￿ s choice, and ￿0
￿im for the choices of the other chains.

















. I need to
simulate chain i￿ s choice by using f~ ￿n
1m1; ~ ￿n
2m1g so that I can calculate the entry
and exit costs chain i actually incurs. In contrast, I can simulate the other chains￿
choices by directly using the choice probability based on ￿0
￿im since further steps
do not require the entry and exit costs these chains incur.





￿=1 by iterating the
process shown in (b) for T times.
(d) Calculate chain i￿ s expected revenue g ER
k;n
imt by using the revenue function esti-










(e) Calculate eq (10).
46D Appendix: Transition Function Estimates
E Appendix: Procedure of Counterfactual Experiments
I ￿rst calculate the predicted values of the operating costs and the entry costs of these two
chains under each policy by using the OLS estimates in the second column of Table 11 and
Table 12. I put zeros to the parameters of Zoning Approval since these estimates are not
statistically signi￿cant in both regressions. I next numerically solve the Bellman equation
under a particular set of structural parameters to obtain the approximated value function
and the resulting policy functions. Using these equilibrium policy functions, I simulate
the model. I employ the algorithm originally suggested by Pakes and McGuire (1994) and
extended by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) to games of incomplete information. In
all the experiments, I ￿x all market-speci￿c values, such as population, to their value in the
￿rst quarter of 2005 to reduce the state space. Hence the state space consists of the number
of hotels belonging to one chain, the number of hotels belonging to the rival chain and which
quarter is the current period. The number of possible states is 256 (= 8 ￿ 8 ￿ 4). All the
experiments converge after around 600 iterations.
47